Justices as “Sacred Symbols”:Antonin Scalia and the Cultural Life of the Law by Jones, Brian Christopher & Sarat, Austin
                                                              
University of Dundee
Justices as “Sacred Symbols”
Jones, Brian Christopher; Sarat, Austin
Published in:
British Journal of American Legal Studies
DOI:
10.1515/bjals-2017-0002
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Jones, B. C., & Sarat, A. (2017). Justices as “Sacred Symbols”: Antonin Scalia and the Cultural Life of the Law.
British Journal of American Legal Studies, 6(1), 7-23. DOI: 10.1515/bjals-2017-0002
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Nov. 2017
Justices as “sacred symbols”:  
antonin scalia and the cultural life of the law
Brian Christopher Jones* & Austin Sarat**
Liverpool Hope University; Amherst College, Amherst, MA
ABSTRACT
Perhaps no single judge in recent years has embodied the intricacies and difficulties 
of the cultural life of the law as much as American Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia. While common law judges have traditionally acquired status—and cultural 
relevance—from the significance, eloquence and forcefulness of their judicial opinions, 
Justice Scalia took an altogether different route. Both on and off the bench, he pushed 
the limits of legal and political legitimacy. He did this through a strict adherence to 
what we call a “judicial mandate,” flamboyant but engaging writing, biting humor 
and widespread marketing of his originalist and textualist interpretative theories. This 
article chronicles these features of Scalia’s jurisprudence and public life more generally, 
ultimately characterising the late justice as a “sacred symbol” in American legal and 
political circles, and beyond. 
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Justices as “sacred symbols”
The idea of the brilliant and elegant philosopher judge has a long and romanticized 
history. From Sir Edward Coke, William Blackstone and Joseph Story to Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis and Lord Bingham, the common law is replete with 
this vision of judging. In this vision, judges sometimes seem to be law makers as much 
as faithful it interpreters. In many ways Antonin Scalia fought against this traditional 
vision of the philosopher judge. He disliked activist judges who imposed their idea of 
wisdom on elected legislatures; in fact, he trumpeted his jurisprudence for its fidelity 
to law and deference to the popular will. But even though Scalia fought against the 
romantic vision of philosopher judge, he himself became a living symbol of a judicial 
philosophy, a symbol so powerful that sometimes it was difficult to disentangle the 
judge from his jurisprudence. His status as a symbol and how he achieved his status 
was much different from the route of the judges mentioned above. This paper attempts 
to explain how Scalia became what we call a judicial “sacred symbol.” 
i. scalia’s death
Antonin Scalia died in the early morning hours of February 13, 2016. Reactions 
to his death were resoundingly, even if begrudgingly, laudatory; either way 
you cut it, Scalia was a giant in terms of his impact on American law. Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one of Scalia’s closest friends on the Court—but also an 
ideological sparring partner—said, “‘We are different, we are one’, different in 
our interpretation of written texts, one in our reverence for the Constitution and 
the institution we serve.”1 Even those outside traditional legal and political circles 
took note of Scalia’s passing and commented on his larger than life status. Stephen 
Colbert, a late-night comedian who on many occasions had lambasted Scalia’s 
views on the law, recounted an unexpectedly warm moment with the Justice, and 
praised him for his sense of humor,2 a characteristic that we also explore below. 
Colleagues, friends, journalists, acquaintances, and others, acknowledged him as a 
quintessential, if controversial, American judge. 
A range of memorials and acknowledgements followed Scalia’s death. The 
George Mason University School of Law announced it would rename itself: The 
Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University.3 Law reviews published 
tributes. For example, the Minnesota Law Review published an online symposium 
providing a number of insightful articles about Scalia,4 and the Harvard Law Review 
dedicated an issue to the late Justice, complete with commentary from Chief Justice 
John Roberts, Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Cass Sunstein, 
1 NPR Staff, All Things Considered: Ginsburg and Scalia: “Best Buddies,” nPr (Feb. 
15, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/466848775/scalia-ginsburg-opera-commem-
orates-sparring-supreme-court-friendship. 
2 The Late Show with Stephen Colbert (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jeJHrIqWsNw . 
3 Susan Svrluga, It’s Official: George Mason’s Law School is Named in Honor of An-
tonin Scalia, wash. Post, (May 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
grade-point/wp/2016/05/17/its-official-george-masons-law-school-is-named-in-honor-
of-antonin-scalia/. 
4 Scalia Symposium, 101 minn. l. reV. headnotes (2016), http://www.minnesotalawre-
view.org/headnote-issue/volume-101-scalia-symposium/. 
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John Manning, Martha Minow and Rachel Barcow.5 One prominent legal scholar 
who has written extensively about judges’ legacies noted that Scalia “has a definite 
shot at greatness.”6
In fact, a marked difference highlighted reactions to Scalia’s death and the 
death of former Chief Justice William Rehnquist one decade earlier, on December 
5, 2005. Beyond the shock of an untimely death—it was known for some time 
that Rehnquist was battling cancer—Scalia’s death left not only a vacancy on the 
Supreme Court, but was also blow to conservative legal thought. While Rehnquist 
had served on the Court longer than Scalia, it was Scalia who had pushed for the 
Court to move its jurisprudence in a different direction.7 Rehnquist may have moved 
the Court—and therefore America—to the right simply by his presence, but Scalia, 
arguably, moved an entire body of legal thought to the right, and made it so that 
even those who did not agree with his interpretative methods had to come to terms 
with them.8 But as Justice Kagan has recently said, it was not just his interpretive 
methodologies that were significant. As she put it, the late justice “did nothing 
less than transform our legal culture.”9 Indeed, as we will discuss below, Scalia 
significantly pushed the boundaries judicial behavior—both on and off the bench—
within the United States and potentially abroad. Indeed, he was not merely a judge, 
but a marketer and perhaps even a showman … and a formidable one at that. 
A. A Crisis of sCAliAn ProPortions
Although the passing of any justice during a presidential election year would generate 
controversy and concern, the passing of such a provocative and widely celebrated 
justice certainly enhanced the chaos, creating a quasi-constitutional crisis. In one 
incident, the Chair of the Senate judiciary committee (Sen. Chuck Grassley (R., 
IA)), made an unprecedented speech on the Senate floor about the politicization 
of the Supreme Court, accentuating its politicization—or, at least, the appearance 
of it. Grassley claimed that this was not the result of the Senate’s confirmation 
processes,10 but because of the Court’s own decisions. Senator Grassley even boldly 
5 John G. Roberts, Jr., In Memoriam: Justice Antonin Scalia, 130 harV. l. reV. 1 (2016). 
6 Jack Balkin, Justice Scalia’s Legacy, balkinization (Sept. 7, 2016), https://balkin.blog-
spot.co.uk/2016/09/justice-scalias-legacy.html. 
7 Although, it should be acknowledged that Rehnquist contributed to the originalist move-
ment as well, if only by denouncing “living constitutionalism”. See, e.g., William H. 
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 tex. l. reV. 693 (1976). 
8 As Justice Kagan famously noted in her confirmation hearings, “we are all orginalists” 
(see Jonathan H. Adler, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, wash. Post 
(June 29, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/
AR2010062902652.html). 
9 Six Justices Help Dedicate Mason’s Scalia Law School, Antonin Scalia Law School, 
George Mason University, https://www2.gmu.edu/redefining-excellence/six-justices-
help-dedicate-mason%E2%80%99s-scalia-law-school. 
10 Senator Chuck Grassley on Politicization of the Supreme Court, C-SPAN (Apr. 5, 
2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4587587/senator-chuck-grassley-politicization-
supreme-court. Just days earlier, Chief Justice John Roberts gave a speech denunciat-
ing the Senate confirmation process as politicising the American judiciary, and more 
importantly, the Supreme Court (Adam Liptak, John Roberts Criticized Supreme Court 
Confirmation Process, BeforeThere Was a Vacancy, n.y. times (March 21, 2016), avail-
able at http://nyti.ms/1Rep9Ps). 
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instructed Chief Justice John Roberts, “physician, heal thyself,” as regards the 
Court’s overly political decisions.11 While Senator Grassley’s comments surprised 
and even angered some, recent polls have demonstrated that the American public 
has less confidence in the Supreme Court than at any point in history; a July 2016 
Gallup poll found that 52% of Americans disapproved of the way the Supreme 
Court was handling its job.12 
Scalia’s death has also left a four-four ideological split among the Court’s 
remaining justices. In some nations this would not be a major issue, but for one in 
which the Supreme Court decides the “nation’s most pressing issues,”13 it is indeed 
a problem. On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit, to replace 
Scalia. The Senate refused to move forward on his nomination, and Judge Garland 
endured the longest-delay of any Supreme Court nominee in history, passing the 
likes of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, as he awaited a hearing (that would 
never come) on his nomination.14 
There are signs that, even after the recent Presidential election in the United 
States, Senate approval of Supreme Court nominations could still be a major 
constitutional issue. Before the election, some Republicans discussed the possibility 
that, should Hilary Clinton become President, the Senate would refuse to confirm 
any of her Supreme Court nominees.15 And now that Donald Trump has won the 
presidency, Democrats may employ various delaying strategies against his nominee 
Neil Gorsuch, or any of his other potential nominees. As Graham notes, the proposed 
Republican plan would have been the opposite of FDR’s infamous court-packing 
plan, slowly diminishing the number of justices on the Court. To justify this effort, 
some commentators claimed that the Constitution allows for non-confirmation of 
any Presidential nominees to the Court.16 While it is possible that any death on the 
“conservative” side of the Court could have brought this situation about, the fact 
that it was Scalia’s seat which became vacant amplified the stakes in replacing him. 
B. the Progression of this ArtiCle
To try to make sense of the meaning of, and reactions to, Scalia’s death, we investigate how 
Scalia became a “sacred symbol.”17 First we examine the changing role of the American 
11 Id. 
12 Supreme Court, galluP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx (al-
though, the percentage disapproving dropped to 47 in Sept. 2016).
13 Editorial Board, A Crippled Supreme Court’s New Term, n.y. times (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://nyti.ms/2d7WGhO. 
14 John Shuppe, Merrick Garland Now Holds the Record for Longest Supreme Court Wait, 
reuters (July 20, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/merrick-garland-
now-holds-record-longest-supreme-court-wait-n612541. 
15 David A. Graham, What Happens If Republicans Refuse to Replace Justice Scalia?, the 
atlantic (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/whats-
the-opposite-of-court-packing/506081/. 
16 Ilya Shapiro, The Senate Should Refuse to Confirm All of Hillary Clinton’s Judicial 
Nominees, the federalist (Oct. 26, 2016), https://thefederalist.com/2016/10/26/senate-
refuse-confirm-hillary-clintons-judicial-nominees/. 
17 We are hesitant to provide a definition of “sacred symbol” here, but do so below, after 
we have taken these issues into consideration. In terms of how Scalia may have been a 
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judiciary, and how Scalia became perhaps the face of it. While American judges have a 
long history of engaging in Academic scholarship,18 only relatively recently have they 
become more publicly engaged, giving lectures and appearing on television, in addition 
to appearing at promotional events for books they author. Are such changes here to stay; 
and if so, what does this mean for the cultural life of the law? 
We follow this by addressing Scalia’s rise as the leader of conservative 
jurisprudence. Tracking Scalia’s trajectory, including his connections to the 1980s 
conservative movement and other prominent conservative legal thinkers, like Robert 
Bork, is essential to understanding his “sacred symbol” status. Here the issue of 
judicial “mandates” arises. Although it may be odd to think in such terms, many 
American judges are characterized throughout their careers by reference to who 
nominated them and when they were nominated. Indeed, nomination by a particular 
president often impacts how the media or general public perceives justices. We discuss 
the significance of the perception that Supreme Court judges have “mandates.” 
Next, we consider Justice Scalia’s writing. Scalia was notorious for the strident 
tone and rhetorical ingenuity of his opinions and often mentioned that this was used 
to engage his readers. While questions arise concerning the audience for Supreme 
Court opinions, it is not surprising that Scalia had his own thoughts on the matter; 
he repeatedly stated throughout the years that one of the primary audiences for 
judgments was law students. Connected to Scalia’s writing, we scrutinize the way 
he used humor. He often found moments for laughter, and this was especially so on 
the bench—either in oral argument or through his sarcastic opinions. 
In the following section we examine how Justice Scalia used and marketed his 
jurisprudential theories. His prolific writing and active promotion of “originalist” 
and “textualist” theories raise further questions about judges and their connection 
to popular culture. Finally, we return to the idea of Scalia as a “sacred symbol” 
and consider how this idea may impact the cultural life of the law. Although there 
is a large literature on judicial reputation and the behavior of judges,19 we take a 
different—perhaps complementary—approach, examining Justice Scalia’s cultural 
significance and impact, and using him as a lens to help us better understand the 
cultural relevance, and consequence, of judging in the 21st century. 
ii. the changing (Public) role of the Judiciary
In some jurisdictions supreme or constitutional court justices seem to be 
contemporary deities, balancing the scales of justice through reasoned (and 
sometimes impassioned) judgments; in other jurisdictions, such judges are merely…
well, judges. This distinction sometimes hinges on constitutional structures and 
“sacred symbol” not only in America but also in foreign jurisdictions, see James Allan’s 
article in this collection: James Allan, One of My Favorite Judges: Constitutional 
Interpretation, Democracy and Antonin Scalia, 6 brit. J. am. l. studies (2017). 
18 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the U.S., in h.P. lee, 
Judiciaries in comParatiVe PersPectiVe 519-523 (2011).
19 See, e.g., nuno garouPa & tom ginsburg, Judicial rePutation: a comParatiVe theory 
(2015); lawrence baum, Judges and their audiences: a PersPectiVe on Judicial 
behaVior (2006).
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types of judicial review available in particular jurisdictions, but as other researchers 
have acknowledged, separating strong-forms and weak-forms of review is not as 
easy as it seems.20 Yet Justice Scalia’s judicial career highlighted a number of 
important issues concerning the contemporary role and status of the judiciary. 
Without a doubt, the constitutionalization of rights throughout the world has 
brought about a judicial renaissance,21 and led to a corresponding expansion of 
judicial review that contains significant consequences for the distribution of power 
within any given polity.22 Nevertheless, states continue to put—or at least allow—
contentious problems to fall into the hands of judges.23 Constitutional courts, 
therefore, are prominent symbols of the operation of the law or legal process within 
a given state, and their judges are widely considered the most prominent actors 
within such processes. This is true whether or not a state’s judiciary has a good or 
bad reputation, or whether judges engage in strong-form or weak form review. 
When Alexander Hamilton characterized the American judiciary as the “least 
dangerous branch”24 he certainly did not mean that it would be unpopular or culturally 
irrelevant. In fact, it may be the case that “least dangerous” correlates with “highest 
approval” or most popular branch of government. Throughout modern history the 
U.S. Supreme Court has enjoyed relatively high popularity,25 at least compared to 
Congress.26 The strategic positioning of the Court has also changed throughout its 
history. Unlike its previous location in the Old Senate Chamber (in addition to other 
places), the Court now sits in a prominent position in the nation’s capital. Bordered 
by the Library of Congress to the south, the Capitol to the west, and Constitution 
Avenue to the north, the building resides in the city’s political epicenter. Above the 
tall roman pillars to the building’s entrance is inscribed the phrase: “Equal Justice 
Under Law.” Whether or not this is what the Court actually provides is irrelevant; 
the takeaway is that, in terms of American justice, the Supreme Court is the most 
prominent, as well as last, port of call for those seeking a judicial remedy. 
Adding to this prominence is the fact that, in the United States, judges have 
become more significant as public figures who participate in a wide range of extra-
judicial activity, such as delivering speeches, agreeing to interviews, appearing on 
talk shows, and of course writing scholarly books and articles. While Supreme Court 
justices—and the American judiciary as a whole—have long been involved in such 
20 Aileen Kavanagh, What’s so Weak about “Weak-Form Review”? The Case of the UK 
Human Rights Act 1998, 13 int’l J. constit. l. 1008 (2015). 
21 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 law & 
soc’y reV. 117 (2001).  
22 See, e.g., ran hirschl, towards Juristocracy: the origins and consequences of the 
new constitutionalism (2004). 
23 Ginsburg and Virsteeg found that the ability of courts to “supervise implementation of 
the constitution and to set aside legislation for constitutional incompatibility” increased 
from 38% in 1951 to 83% in 2011 (Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries 
Adopt Constitutional Review? 30 J.l. econ. & org. 587 (2014)).
24 federalist No. 78. 
25 Supreme Court, galluP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4732/supreme-court.aspx. 
26 The Court’s approval rating remains high even with the numbers mentioned earlier. See, 
e.g., Brian Christopher Jones, Disparaging the Supreme Court, Part II: Questioning 
Institutional Legitimacy, 2016 wis. l. reV. 239 (2016). The piece notes how the Court, 
compared to Congress, may get a free ride as regards similar issues, such as workload or 
institutional output. 
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extra-judicial activities, today they are much more common. But whether or not 
this increase in extra-judicial activity carries positive implications for the judiciary 
remains to be seen. As Jeffrey Shaman has stated, the “line between permissible 
and impermissible extra-judicial activity is not an easy one to walk, and is redrawn 
from time to time.”27 Justice Scalia was certainly one to push those boundaries. 
iii. scalia’s rise to “sacred symbol”
Some may look at Scalia’s tenure on the Court and find it relatively easy to classify 
him as a “sacred symbol;” others may scoff at the idea of thinking of him in that 
way. Sceptics would point to the fact that, although Scalia served on the Court 
for close to thirty years, he was not even in the top ten of the Supreme Court’s 
longest-serving justices.28 In fact William Rehnquist served for 33 years, and had 
more time to impact the Court’s jurisprudence. Additionally, outside of Heller,29 
Scalia did not author many well-known opinions on major constitutional issues. 
He was mostly known for, and appeared to thrive on, his predilection for fiery 
dissents. Finally, although Scalia was certainly respected in the legal community, 
he did not have a squeaky clean personal reputation. Long known for being smug,30 
brash,31 aggressive,32 dogmatic,33 and overly sarcastic,34 Scalia used these qualities 
to advance his agenda and fend off his rivals. 
Nonetheless, many other things turned Scalia into a “sacred symbol,” and 
these are explored below. 
A. Judging for the right: fulfilling (or not fulfilling)  
JudiCiAl “MAndAtes”
Like Justices John Roberts, Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, Clarence Thomas, 
Steven Breyer and Samuel Alito, and a host of other SCOTUS justices before them, 
27 Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judges and Non-Judicial Functions in the U.S., in h.P. lee, Judicia-
ries in comParatiVe PersPectiVe 528 (2011). 
28 List of United States Supreme Court Justices by Time in Office, wikiPedia, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Supreme_Court_Justices_by_time_in_office. 
29 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
30 Joe Patrice, Justice Scalia Forced to Eat Crow for His Own Smugness, aboVe the law 
(Sept. 3, 2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/09/justice-scalia-forced-to-eat-crow-for-
his-own-smugness/. 
31 Joe Johns, Antonin Scalia Known for Sharp Mind and Brash Demeanor, cnn (feb. 
13, 2016), http://edition.cnn.com/videos/us/2016/02/13/justice-antonin-scalia-legacy-
supreme-court-johns.cnn/video/playlists/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dead/. 
32 Margaret Talbot, Supreme Confidence, new yorker (Mar. 28, 2005), http://www.newy-
orker.com/magazine/2005/03/28/supreme-confidence (“Scalia’s interactions with law-
yers are notoriously aggressive.”).
33 Dahlia Lithwick, Scalia v. Scalia, atlantic (June 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2014/06/scalia-v-scalia/361621/ (“But once he was ensconced among 
the chosen few, a dogmatic…need to be right became [Scalia’s] guide.”).
34 Richard L. Hasen, The Most Sarcastic Justice, 18 green bag 2d 215 (2015).
14
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 7/3/17 1:46 PM
Justices as “sacred symbols”
Scalia had extensive experience in federal government before ascending to the 
bench, and thus was familiar with the politics of law and the law of politics. Scalia 
served in government at a time when ideas about originalism were on the move 
both intellectually and practically, and like any great opportunist—and without a 
doubt, Scalia was one—Scalia took advantage of it. When Bork,35 Rehnquist36 and 
Berger37 were publishing their influential work on originalism, Edwin Meese had 
control of the Reagan Justice Department.38 After a stint in the powerful Office of 
Legal Counsel (1974-1977), Scalia spent a few years working in academia at the 
University of Virginia and then at the University of Chicago, honing his views on 
law and especially on his interpretative theories. During this time, he served as the 
founding faculty adviser of the Federalist Society, a group which advocates judicial 
restraint, but that also champions conservative causes.39 Scalia forged a conservative 
ideology that would come to define his jurisprudence, and which ultimately led to 
two judicial appointments under Reagan: one to the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. 
Circuit) in 1982, and the other to the Supreme Court in 1986. Scalia’s ascension to 
the Court, like so many other SCOTUS justices, was a reward for political service. 
But would Scalia fulfill his judicial “mandate” as a Reagan nominee, or would he 
feel unshackled by his lifetime appointment to the nation’s highest court? 
The idea of judicial mandates arises from the fact that in the U.S. federal judicial 
appointment stems from a political process: nominations operate on a fairly open 
process that involves selection by the President and confirmation from the Senate, 
two inherently political branches. Until recently that process worked relatively 
smoothly,40 with the longest hearing or confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee 
taking 125 days.41 Because of this overtly political process, citizens may associate 
justices with the President who nominated them. In fact, the media consistently link 
justices with the President nominated them.42 If citizens are constantly encountering 
information about which president appointed which justices, then of course there 
will be an implicit—if not entirely explicit—connection from politics to law. 
The expectations arising from judicial mandates fueled controversy about Chief 
Justice John Roberts’ role in protecting the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) 
35 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 ind. l.J. 1 
(1971). 
36 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 tex. l. reV. 693 (1976). 
37 raoul berger, goVernment by Judiciary (1977). 
38 Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985); See also, 
Edwin Meese III, The Case for ‘Originalism’, the heritage foundation, http://www.
heritage.org/research/commentary/2005/06/the-case-for-originalism (June 6, 2005). 
39 See, http://www.fed-soc.org/ for more information. 
40 Of course, not all those that were nominated to the Court acceded to it. There have been 
many withdrawals and some votes against candidates. 
41 US Federal Judge Merrick Garland, Barak Obama’s Supreme Court nominee to replace 
Justice Scalia, waited over 125 days, passing the previous record set by Louis Brandeis, 
for even a hearing on the possibility of assuming office. Ultimately, that hearing never 
came.
42 keith J. bybee, all Judges are Political excePt when they are not: accePtable hy-
Pocrisies and the rule of law 12 (2010). (“The media regularly identifies federal judg-
es by the president who nominated them & consistently tags judges as either “liberal” or 
“conservative”, implicitly suggesting that judicial actions are best understood as a form 
of partisan policymaking”). 
15
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against potentially fatal legal challenges in 201243 and 2015.44 Many prominent 
Republicans spoke out against the Chief Justice, and, as noted above, Senator Chuck 
Grassley (R., IA) recently directed some pointed words towards Justice Roberts 
and the politicization of the Supreme Court.45 But Roberts is certainly not the only 
example of a U.S. Supreme Court justice accused of betraying his “mandate.” Justice 
Harry Blackmun (1970-1994), once beloved by conservatives, was, by the end of 
his tenure, loathed by the right. Nominated by Richard Nixon, Justice Blackmun 
earned the enduring ire of conservatives for his decision in Roe v. Wade.46 He went 
on to defy his closest friend on the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969-1986), 
and in his later years often voted with the court’s liberal block. Such “unfulfilled” 
judicial mandates have not been uncommon among SCOTUS justices (see Earl 
Warren, William Brennan, John Paul Stevens and David Souter, among others). 
The idea of judicial mandates certainly has political and legal implications that 
may impact judicial independence, a notion that is considered an essential and long-
standing element of the rule of law. If judges feel under any obligation to the president 
who nominated them, it may compromise their ability to impartially adjudicate. 
As regards Scalia, there is no doubt that he fulfilled and even surpassed his 
mandate. Scalia used his conservative background, perhaps even his religion,47 to 
put himself forward as the “godfather”48 of judicial conservativism. Whether or not 
he stuck firmly to his principles is up for debate,49 but the widespread perception 
of Scalia as the vanguard of conservative jurisprudence remains one of his lasting 
legacies, and certainly underlined his status as a “sacred symbol.” 
B. sCAliA’s intAngiBles: A PersonAlity on the Court
1. his Writing
Long known as a leading “formalist,”50 Scalia certainly did not act like a formalist 
when it came to his writing style or behavior during oral argument. His writing 
on the Court often drew a combination of praise, ire and disbelief. How could a 
Supreme Court justice get away with using “jiggery-pokery,” referencing “broccoli” 
mandates, or referring to colleagues reasoning as “pure applesauce”? On numerous 
occasions Scalia noted that he wrote his judgments, and especially his dissents, 
43 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. _ , 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). 
44 King v. Burwell, 576  U.S. _ , 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
45 Caitlin Hillyard, Senator Chuck Grassley on Politicization of the Supreme Court, C-
SPAN (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4587587/senator-chuck-grassley-
politicization-supreme-court. 
46 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47 Associated Press, Scalia Dismisses Religious Neutrality: ‘Nothing Wrong’ with State 
Invoking God, guardian (Jan. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/jan/02/
supreme-justice-antonin-scalia-dismisses-religious-neutrality. 
48 Noah Feldman, Justice Scalia: The Last Originalist, bloomberg View (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-02-16/justice-scalia-the-last-originalist. 
49 See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 
u. cin. l. reV. 7, 12 (2006).
50 Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 yale l.J. 529 (1997).
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for law students.51 Given the status and prominence of the U.S. Supreme Court—
not only from a national perspective but also internationally—this is a curious 
statement. Was the notion of “writing for law students” merely an excuse to pen his 
decisions in a more biting or engaging tone? 
 Law students cannot yet practice law, but they do have to read and discuss 
Supreme Court opinions. Scalia believed that if students must read these opinions, 
then the decisions should be entertaining and engaging. But if Justice Scalia aimed 
at legal amateurs, why would he not aim his opinions at the wider citizenry? There 
is certainly nothing wrong with justices aiming their opinions at a wide audience. 
After all, using non-technical or “plain language” is something that other judges 
have championed; Sonia Sotomayor has incorporated plain language tactics, and 
has noted that the technical language of the law may obscure the relevance of 
a decision.52 But, is not the primary audience for any jurisdiction’s supreme or 
constitutional court the wider citizenry? From a legal perspective the only sub-group 
Supreme Court judgments matter to are the parties involved in the litigation. But 
the higher the court, the more frequently the decisions will be used by lower courts 
when adjudicating similar disputes. Thus, even from a purely legal perspective 
there are multiple audiences for such judgments. 
A political scientist may think that Supreme Court judgments are relevant for a 
number of reasons. For example, such decisions may demonstrate a political check 
on executive or legislative actions, thus justifying the separation of powers; or a 
decision may have direct relevance to a prominent political issue, thus presenting 
an opportunity for political mobilization. This expands the potential audiences for 
judges and their decision but does not necessarily go far enough. 
A cultural viewpoint, however, would provide a more complete perspective. 
Such a perspective recognizes that judicial opinions are used not just by legal 
and political actors, but by a plethora of individuals, from journalists, academics, 
businesses, and police forces to citizens and even by others in foreign jurisdictions. 
Some opinions may even become cultural touchstones, assuming iconic status for 
citizens (i.e., Brown or Roe). Thus, to distinguish Supreme Court judgments as 
meant for a specific group discounts their large cultural relevance. Perhaps Scalia’s 
biting sarcasm or linguistic provocations were a veiled recognition of this cultural 
perspective. Perhaps he was not intending to “trash” his colleagues or de-legitimize 
the court, so much as he was attempting to say (in his own unique style, of course): 
“hey, look at what we’re doing here…this is important to everyone.” 
2. his huMor
Justice Scalia famously repeated the line, “I am an originalist. I am a textualist. I am 
not a nut,”53 and it was Scalia who first called himself a “faint-hearted originalist,”54 
51 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 34, at 223; Molly Cooke, Justice Scalia Addresses First-
year Law Students, the hoya (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.thehoya.com/justice-scalia-
addresses-first-year-law-students/. 
52 See, e.g., Steven Schwinn, Opinion Analysis: Plain Language Rules the Day (and Keeps 
a Claim Alive) in Prisoner-Rights Suit, scotusblog (June 6, 2016), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-plain-language-rules-the-day-and-keeps-a-
claim-alive-in-prisoner-rights-suit/. 
53 Jeffrey Rosen, If Scalia Had His Way, n.y. times (Jan. 8, 2011), http://nyti.ms/1H77IMw. 
54 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 u. cin. l. reV. 849, 864 (1989). 
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He was recognized by many—even by those outside of legal circles—for his 
caustic wit and his predilection for humor.55 Oftentimes during oral argument he 
would (at least attempt to) liven things up with a sarcastic comment or a joke. 
Scalia was by far the funniest justice on the Court for the past decade (followed by 
Stephen Breyer).56 The number of laughs he received in oral argument far outpaced 
any other justice (although there is not a rate for “attempts at humor” versus actual 
laughs). Nonetheless, Scalia used his humor to establish himself as an interesting 
and memorable judge. 
It is difficult to ascertain just how or why Scalia felt the need to frequently 
make light of the work of the Court or himself or of a particular situation. Perhaps it 
was humor for humor’s sake, and that is fair enough, especially in a world that often 
takes things far too seriously.57 But there are other outcomes stemming from Justice 
Scalia’s humor and engaging writing style. The humor Scalia used on and off the 
bench and in opinions called attention to him. It made him more than just another 
dry or overly-technical Supreme Court justice. Thus, Scalia opened himself up on 
the bench, displaying personality traits in ways that other justices remain hesitant 
to do. This is helpful to understanding Scalia’s status as “sacred symbol.” The idea 
that a judge is not just a judge, but a living, breathing and as it sometimes turns out, 
entertaining person, is something that the law—rightly or wrongly—attempts to 
hide through overarching principles and codes of behavior. It was not as if Scalia 
disrespected those principles—although some certainly claim that he did—but that 
he challenged the traditional notions of judging. 
C. leAding interPretAtive theorist And MArketer
Scalia’s influence on American law—and perhaps more importantly, on how 
constitutional cases are interpreted throughout the state and federal judiciary— 
was immense. He championed 58 originalist and textualist interpretative theories,59 
and was not bashful when confronting others who operated on different interpretations.60 
Many U.S. judges have been recognized as leading interpretative theorists, 
but not all of them sat on the Supreme Court. Jerome Frank, a leader in the legal 
realist movement, sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit between 
1941 and 1957. His first book, Law and the Modern Mind,61 written after he had 
undergone six months of psychotherapy, was extremely influential among judges 
and scholars. Transaction Publishing has even recently re-published the book, with 
55 See, e.g., in this volume, James Allan, supra note 17.
56 Ryan A. Malphurs, Jaime Bochantin, L. Hailey Drescher & Melissa Wallace Framer, 
Too Much Frivolity, Not Enough Femininity: A Study of Gender and Humor at the U.S. 
Supreme Court (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2335613. 
57 Justice Scalia’s Under-the-Chin Gesture, NPR (Mar. 30, 2006), http://www.npr.org/tem-
plates/story/story.php?storyId=5312065. 
58 Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist 
Theory, in, the challenge of originalism: theories of constitutional interPretation 
22-23 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds. 2011). 
59 antonin scalia & brian garner, reading law: the interPretation of legal texts 
(2012). 
60 See Allan, supra note 17.
61 Jerome frank, law and the modern mind (1930). 
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an introduction from celebrated constitutional scholar Brian H. Bix.62 Another more 
recent example is Richard Posner, who has served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit since 1981. He is a leading proponent of law and economics, 
and his 1973 book, The Economic Analysis of Law,63 has been widely acclaimed. 
Other jurisdictions have had their share of heavyweight legal intellectuals. Given its 
status as the birth of the common law, Britain is one of those places. Judges such as 
William Blackstone64 and Sir Edward Coke65 were giants of their day, not to mention 
more contemporary figures, such as Lord Denning66 and Tom Bingham.67 And yet, 
judges in the U.K. remain relatively insulated from public scrutiny.68 While already 
a towering figure in UK legal circles, Bingham became famous for his articulation 
of the rule of law.69 But as prominent as Bingham was, not many citizens outside 
legal circles knew him. In fact, there is probably a significant percentage of Brits 
that cannot name a sitting judge, let alone a U.K. Supreme Court justice. 
Throughout history American judges have produced serious, academic 
scholarship,70 some of which pushed the bounds of legal or interpretative theory. 
Thus books, law review articles and speeches have been commonly accepted media 
for judges. But what happens when the bounds of academic scholarship stretch into 
quasi-promotional events? 
Engaging in academic scholarship is fundamentally different from actively 
marketing ideas to the citizenry. And yet Scalia engaged in such marketing activities. 
At one point the Wall St. Journal characterized his many public appearances as 
“The Justice Scalia Roadshow.”71 While promoting books late in his career, such as 
Making Your Case72 and Reading Law,73 he made many appearances on television 
shows that Supreme Court justices do not usually find themselves on, such as 60 
Minutes (CBS), Charlie Rose (PBS), Piers Morgan Tonight (CNN) and Fox News 
Sunday (Fox). According to the U.S. Code of Judicial Conduct, these appearances 
apparently fall under Canon 4(A)(1): speaking, writing, lecturing, and teaching.74 
62 Jerome frank, law and the modern mind (2009). 
63 richard Posner, the economic analysis of law (1973). 
64 See, e.g., wilfrid Prest (ed.), blackstone and his commentaries: biograPhy, law, his-
tory (2009). 
65 See, e.g., daVid chan smith, sir edward coke and the reformation of the laws: re-
ligion, Politics and JurisPrudence, 1578-1616 (2014). 
66 See, e.g., edmund heward, lord denning: a biograPhy (2d ed.) (1997); lord denning, 
the closing chaPter (1983).
67 See, e.g., mads andenas & duncan fairgrieVe, tom bingham and the transformation 
of the law (2011). 
68 Although, the latest reaction to the High Court’s decision regarding Brexit (Miller v. Sec-
retary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768), may demonstrate 
that things are changing in Britain. 
69 tom bingham, the rule of law (2011). 
70 Shaman, supra note 27. 
71 Dan Slater, Scalia Justifies His Jurisprudence: ‘I am Not a Nut’, wsJ law blog (Apr. 8, 2008), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/04/08/scalia-justifies-his-jurisprudence-i-am-not-a-nut/. 
72 antonin scalia & bryan garner, making your case: the art of Persuading Judges 
(2008). 
73 antonin scalia & bryan garner, reading law: the interPretation of legal texts 
(2012). 
74 Code of Conduct for United States Judges, 175 F.R.D. 363 (1998): “A judge may speak, 
write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal 
system, and the administration of justice.”
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After all, Scalia was promoting his book that was about “the law, the legal system, 
and the administration of justice.”75 Scalia certainly pushed the bounds regarding 
what is acceptable/unacceptable in this domain. 
1. sCAliA, Judging And PoP Culture
Although U.S. Supreme Court decisions have been shown to generally follow 
public opinion,76 the court itself, historically, has been slow to catch on with 
certain aspects of popular culture (e.g., televised hearings). This is unsurprising 
in some respects. Many justices shy away from the limelight, leaving it to those in 
the political branches. After all, the role of judging traditionally does not involve 
“making news” in the promotional sense. But there was one area in which Scalia 
was genuinely in tune with popular culture: in his theory of originalism. 
The theory of originalism has a deep association with American popular 
culture and the public’s understanding of state symbols such as the Founders and the 
Constitution. Indeed, we are not the first ones to make this case.77 Further, originalist 
and textualist interpretative methods have deep roots. Justice Hugo Black (1937-
1971) was a strong proponent of these methods and was unafraid to advocate them 
to others.78 Part of the connection between originalism and popular culture arises 
from the long-held idolization of the 1789 American Constitution. Even though 
the current reach of the Constitution would probably be unrecognizable to the 
Founders,79 and even though specific sections of the constitution seem antiquated, 
the American public continues to engage in a form of constitutional worship that is 
difficult to find anywhere else.80 
Scalia’s use of originalism is certainly not the only example of his unique 
connection to popular culture. Scalia’s judicial and extra-judicial writings, in 
addition to his courtroom and non-courtroom antics, generally got a wide amount 
of media attention.81 One such example came during oral argument in Department 
75 Id. 
76 For a historical take on this, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. l. 279 (1957); for a more modern 
take, see Gerald Rosenberg, The Road Taken: Robert A. Dahl’s Decision-Making in a De-
mocracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 50 emory l.J. 613 (2001). 
77 See Jack M. Balkin, Why are Americans Originalists?, in law, society and commu-
nity: socio-legal essays in honour of roger cotterrell (David Schiff & Richard 
Nobles eds. 2015); there is also a rebuttal to this piece here: Ilya Somin, The Origins 
of Originalism, wash. Post (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/21/the-origins-of-originalism/; See also Eric A. Posner, 
Trump and the Originalists, (Aug. 8, 2016) available at http://ericposner.com/trump-
and-the-originalists/. 
78 Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black 
and Scalia, 74 b.u. l. reV. 25 (1994). 
79 For example, the prospects of constitutional review of legislation and the striking down 
of Acts of Congress, although it occurs on a regular basis today, were not inherent 
features of the 1789 Constitution. These aspects were decided in Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803).
80 Brian Christopher Jones, Preliminary Warnings on “Constitutional” Idolatry, Pub. law 
74 (2016).
81 Steve Twomey, Scalia Angrily Defends His Duck Hunt with Cheney, n.y. times (Mar. 
18, 2004), http://nyti.ms/29x8clq. 
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of Health and Human Services v. Florida,82 when Scalia compared the government 
making everyone purchase health insurance to the government making everyone 
eat broccoli. Although this line is often thought of as a Scalia original, he actually 
borrowed it.83 Nevertheless, Scalia was keen enough to pick up this analogy and 
use it during oral argument. Although his plea was ultimately unsuccessful, it 
certainly influenced the debate about the Affordable Care Act, and more pointedly, 
the Supreme Court’s 2012 judgment of the law in Sebelius.84
But Scalia was far from the only Supreme Court justice to permeate popular 
culture. In fact, other SCOTUS justices, such as Ruth Bader Ginsberg, are also 
prominent pop culture symbols. After all, the latter has her own nickname (The 
Notorious RGB),85 her own fan blog,86 and of late has been outspoken on some 
inherently political issues.87 On the fan blog visitors can even purchase merchandise, 
including baby clothes, coffee mugs, and carrier bags.88 But Ginsburg is not as 
divisive as Scalia,89 not as formidable an interpretive theorist, and certainly not as 
humorous or biting (not on the bench, nor in her opinions). 
This pop culture relevance can be contrasted with other countries that have 
Supreme or Constitutional Courts. In some jurisdictions judges are widely viewed 
as out of touch with popular culture; and indeed, they are certainly not known 
or “celebrated” in the same way as SCOTUS justices. This is certainly the case 
in Britain, as the judiciary on the whole is relatively unknown outside of legal 
circles, has been criticized as being out of touch, un-representative, and oblivious to 
popular culture. This widely held perception throughout the United Kingdom led to 
the 2012 announcement that judges must undergo cultural awareness training at the 
Judicial College.90 Last December a second-year law student penned a prominent 
82 Dep’t Health & Human Services v. Florida (Oral Argument) (Mar. 27, 2012), p. 13, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.
pdf (“Could you define the market -- everybody has to buy food sooner or later. So, you 
define the market as food; therefore, everybody’s in the market; therefore, you can make 
people buy broccoli”).
83 The trail that stretches back to the early 1990s when Bill Clinton proposed a universal 
health care system. David B. Rivkin Jr., a prominent libertarian lawyer, penned an op-
ed in the Wall St. Journal asking a similar question: can the government regulate the 
diets of those it deems overweight? After consultation by Mr. Rivkin in 2009, Senator 
Orin Hatch (R., UT) made a similar point about buying “certain cars, dishwashers or 
refrigerators.” This led to Terence Jeffrey’s 2009 article in CNS News entitled: “Can 
Obama and Congress Order You to Buy Broccoli. (See Terence P. Jeffrey, Can Obama 
and Congress Order You to Buy Broccoli?, cns news (Oct. 21, 2009), http://cnsnews.
com/blog/terence-p-jeffrey/can-obama-and-congress-order-you-buy-broccoli.) 
84 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. _ , 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). 
85 This is modelled after famous 1990s rapper, the late Notorious BIG. 
86 See http://notoriousrbg.tumblr.com/. 
87 Michael D. Shear, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Expresses Regret for Criticising Donald Trump, 
n.y. times (July 14, 2016), http://nyti.ms/29AWs0l. 
88 One of the coffee mugs available even bears the inscription “The Ruth will set you free.” 
89 Although, she did speak out against a Donald Trump presidency in July 2016: Adam 
Liptak, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, No Fan of Donald Trump, Critiques Latest Term, n. y. 
times (July 10, 2016), http://nyti.ms/29rq7tH. 
90 Jack Doyle, Out-of-Touch Judges to Be Given Lessons in Popular Culture (After One Asked 
Who Are the Beatles?), daily mail (June 16, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2160110/Out-touch-judges-given-lessons-popular-culture-asked-Beatles.html. 
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piece for the Guardian newspaper about how members of the U.K. Supreme 
Court did not look like they had “ever put down their copy of Intellectual Property 
Quarterly to pick up an iPod, tossed aside their Neue Juristische Wochenschrift to 
grab a Now magazine or looked up from the Cambridge Law Journal to watch some 
Celebrity Juice.”91 Further, in 2013 a sitting Supreme Court justice, Baroness Hale, 
even proclaimed that many judges lead “sheltered lives.”92 
At some rudimentary level, being in tune with popular culture means that judges 
must understand and use the technology that is shaping society, and which can open 
up the judiciary to increased transparency and accountability. Perhaps surprisingly, 
this is where Scalia—and on an institutional level, the U.S. Supreme Court more 
generally—have repeatedly chosen to be out of step with popular culture.93 
Compared with other constitutional courts, their ideas on the use of technology both 
inside the courtroom and out is out of step with evolving standards.94 Cameras in the 
courtroom are one such example. For a variety of reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court 
refuses to allow cameras to televise their proceedings. And yet in some countries 
this is common practice. For instance, the U.K. Supreme Court now video records 
all hearings and judgment announcements, and these can be streamed live and are 
also archived on their website.95 Additionally, the UKSC has Twitter, YouTube and 
Flickr channels.96 Even with all these accoutrements, the status of UKSC justices in 
popular culture remains well below their transatlantic counterparts. 
From the above, it should be obvious that Scalia had an ambivalent relationship 
with popular culture, engaging with it when it suited his interpretive style, method 
of justice, or promotional aspirations, and also shunning it when it could potentially 
take him out of his comfort zone or damage his credibility.  
iV. Justice scalia as “sacred symbol”
Calling Scalia a “sacred symbol” captures something of his significance in law, 
politics, and popular culture. As we see it, for a judge to become a sacred symbol 
he or she must: 
91 Kier Baker, Pop Culture 101: A Guide for Out-of-Touch Judges, guardian (10 Dec. 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/dec/10/pop-culture-101-a-guide-for-out-
of-touch-judges. 
92 David Barrett, Judges Lead ‘Sheltered Lives’, Warns Britain’s Most Senior Female 
Judge, telegraPh (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/9976400/Judges-lead-sheltered-lives-warns-Britains-most-senior-female-judge.html. 
93 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, Scalia: Cameras in Supreme Court Would ‘Mis-educate’ Ameri-
cans, Politico (July 26, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/07/
scalia-cameras-in-supreme-court-would-mis-educate-americans-130246. 
94 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 26, at 255-60. 
95 News Release: Catch-up on Court Action: Supreme Court Launches ‘Video on Demand’ 
Service, suP. ct. (May 5, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/catch-up-on-court-
action-supreme-court-launches-video-on-demand-service.html. The Court does have a 
specific “terms of use” policy, where footage is only allowed to be accessed through 
their site.
96 UK Supreme Court (@UKSupremeCourt), twitter, https://twitter.com/uksupreme-
court; UKSupremeCourt, youtube, https://www.youtube.com/user/UKSupremeCourt; 
UK Supreme Court, flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/uksupremecourt. 
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(1) profoundly affect the course of American jurisprudence97 through either 
(a) the significance and impact of his/her judicial opinions, 
(b) his/her influence on other members of the judiciary, or 
(c) through his/her extra-judicial writing/speaking; 
 and 
(2) have a large segment of the citizenry—including those outside legal and 
political circles—develop a profound attachment to him or her.
Some justices may fulfill one or the other of these criteria, but not both. Justice 
Ginsburg clearly satisfies the second, considering that a large segment of Americans 
know her, identify with her, and hold her in high esteem. However—while certainly 
no intellectual slouch—it would be difficult to say that she has “profoundly” 
affected the course of American jurisprudence. On the flip side judges have often 
profoundly affected American jurisprudence, but for whatever reason, have not 
achieved much societal attachment. 
V. conclusion
When a judge becomes a “sacred symbol” he/she may foment internal division 
on a court, and attract wanted and unwanted attention. In Scalia’s case the intense 
controversy surrounding President Obama’s effort to replace him arose from 
Scalia’s status as a “sacred symbol.” Judges as “sacred symbols” may impose high 
costs on the courts on which they sit and in the legal systems in which they serve. 
Recently Keith Bybee splendidly articulated the complex duality of the 
American legal system: that citizens tend to recognize judges as independent 
actors who make impartial decisions, but in so doing they recognize that politics 
or partisanship plays a vital role in judicial decision-making.98 Bybee believes that 
these are “acceptable hypocrisies,” and that (American) courts depend on them to 
function.99 Justice Scalia’s story also displays such potential hypocrisies: at times it 
is difficult to tell whether or not Scalia was pushing the bounds of legal and political 
legitimacy, or in fact, the bounds of legal and political hypocrisy.100 Perhaps he was 
doing both. 
97 Although, it does not necessarily have to be “American” jurisprudence; the “American” 
label can be dropped if need be. Yet, given that we’re primarily analyzing American law, 
that is what we have inserted here. 
98 Bybee, supra, note 42. 
99 Id. 
100 We thank Institutum Iurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica Assistant Research Professor 
Yen-Tu Su for this particular insight. 
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